Sanctions pressure has increased as global mobilization intensified in response to the Gaza genocide. For example, Spain, Turkey, Germany, and Italy have all introduced varying forms of trade and arms restrictions, signaling rising reputational and regulatory risk for Israel. Yet enforcement remains uneven and fragmented, weakened by loopholes, exemptions, and policy reversals. Exploiting these enforcement gaps, the Israeli regime has pursued sanction insulation rather than isolation, even as it continues to champion self-reliance.
As documented by UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese in her 2025 report, the Israeli state has transitioned from an “economy of occupation” to an “economy of genocide,” sustained by dense networks of global and national corporate actors. The report identifies more than 45 corporations as central to this political economy, including weapons manufacturers, technology firms, construction companies, extractive industries, financial institutions, and universities. This corporate infrastructure embeds the Israeli war economy within transnational circuits of finance, production, and technological development, diffusing vulnerability and risk across global networks rather than concentrating them within a single sanctionable channel.
Israel’s defense sector also remains deeply embedded in global production networks. Major firms such as Elbit Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries rely heavily on exports, joint ventures, and co-development with foreign partners. Expanding joint production ecosystems—spanning missile defense, cyber systems, and artificial intelligence—deepens the integration of Israeli firms within transnational defense markets, complicating the feasibility and enforcement of embargo regimes. Co-production arrangements, such as the RTX–Rafael Tamir interceptor line in Arkansas, illustrate how Israel manages offshore manufacturing dependencies through strategic integration.
