Contrary to the analysis of the Dugard report, both Ryan and Shaw’s arguments point to the conclusion that the additional “several reasonable conclusions”available, actually allow us to infer genocidal intent from the factual circumstances, rather than not:
the ICTR recognized that— since, absent extraordinary circumstances or a confession, direct evidence of genocidal intent will very rarely if ever be available— courts must rely on inferences from the surrounding factual circumstances in order to determine whether a defendant acted with the requisite genocidal intent. [Ryan, p. 151]
Factual Circumstances: A Roadmap to Genocide
Ryan goes on to list “four key factors… that courts look to when engaging in this highly-contextual analysis” [p.152]:
1. statements indicating genocidal intent;
2. the scale of the atrocities committed;
3. systematic targeting of the protected group; and
4. evidence suggesting that commission of the genocidal actus reus was consciously planned.